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REWEAVING THE RENT FABRIC, RESTORING 
THE BROKEN POT
Human Dimension, Human Rights, Institutional Actors and Law - A Perspective 
from Africa
By Reginald Herbold Green
The small boy who breaks a pot goes to tell his mother ’It
got broken*. Not *1 broke the pot* but ’It got broken1...
And who did this? We did. We broke the pot.
- Jerry John Rawlings 
President of Ghana
Adjustment programmes which rend the fabric of society 
cannot be sustained.
- E. V. K. Jaycox
Vice President for Africa, 
World Bank
Opportunities should be given to women for greater 
participation in the nation’s political and decision-making 
processes at all levels, especially at the national centres 
of power. Where necessary, appropriate training should be 
given to them to ensure this...
There should be greater openness in the process of 
designing the adjustment package, both within government 
and beyond. In particular, employers, trade unions and 
other relevant groups should be closely associated with the 
process both to improve the design of the programmes and to 
ensure their fuller understanding and support...
In making the protection of the poor an integral part of 
adjustment, the primary strategy should be that of 
enhancing their productive capacity through better access 
to productive resources and assets...
- Khartoum Declaration
What Is The Basic Crisis? The Neo-Liberal View
Analysis, debate and action in respect to the post-1979 generalisation of 
disaster in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, much of Latin America and the 
Caribbean and some Asian countries tends to be fragmented and also to be 
couched in macro (whether economic or geo-political) terms. The initial wave 
of stabilisation and adjustment (whether by forced liberalisation of trade in 
ideology as in much of SSA, by a pre-Gorbachevian or late Hungarian style 
rethinking as in Algeria and arguably Mozambique or by a radical or more 
conservative nationalist consolidation strategy as in Ghana and Nigeria 
respectively) have stressed regaining external, domestic market (price) and 
fiscal balance and reallocating resources (out of a smaller total used) to 
concentrate on restoring production.
The ’’absolute poverty eradication”, ’'employment”, "redistribution with growth" 
and "basic human needs" strands which had begun to multiply and articulate in 
the mid- and late-1970s were for a time nearly snuffed out. Intellectually 
and in efficiency of resource allocation terms this is curious. All of these 
approaches were designed to reduce import requirements, raise food production 
(and ability of poor people to buy - provide a market for - it) , increase 
marginal labour productivity and reallocate investment in both created capital 
and human capabilities to yield more (not less) growth per unit of investment 
and public services. Thus a context of falling resource - and especially 
foreign exchange - availability and of concern for "efficient allocation", 
combined with increasing poverty leading to rising social and political
tensions ought to have been conducive to their further articulation and 
implementation.
That the opposite proved to be the case probably turned on three factors:
1. "what we have we hold" is a deep conviction of elites (governing
sub-class coalition members) anywhere, not least in the South. Universal
access to basic services, programmes directly enabling poor people to
produce/earn more, relative redistribution are all much easier to manage 
if moderately rapid growth ensures that there need be few absolute 
losers. In Africa this was compounded by the fact that easy gains from 
citizenisation of bureaucratic managerial, professional and small 
entrepreneurial positions following independence had largely been
achieved so that there was no longer a politically acceptable set of 
losers to be squeezed;
2. the crises were seen in specific foreign exchange, export, fiscal, 
subsidy, inflation terms leading to specific economic (or at times 
economystic) attempts to fix them without wholistic evaluation of the 
crises and problematics let alone of ways to tackle them;
3. the foreign exchange noose on a majority of African economies could - at 
least in the short and medium term - be loosened only by external 
cooperation. In the North the confident, crusading ideology was 
neo-liberalism including a political economic morality that believed 
greed was good, personal compassion was acceptable but state action to 
ensure minimum access or standards was bad. Not poverty but the poor 
were a disgrace and the victims not their victimisation were the 
appropriate targets for public policy (and the successful greedy its 
appropriate beneficiaries). Nowhere has this been set out more clearly 
than in Prime Minister Thatcher’s 1988 declaration of faith to the 
Assembly of the Church of Scotland (whose reaction suggests they viewed 
it as heresy in a very literal sense) but it has been a powerful, 
pervasive force since 1980 not only in Northern governments but in the 
international financial institutions (especially the IMF since the Bank 
has never been homogenous let alone monolithic, had vested interests in 
health, education and food security and many of its staff rather resented 
the attempt to have the neat, stark neo-liberalism of Eliot Berg foisted 
on them by a few senior officials within and without the Bank).
A Human Condition Crisis?
Since the first third of the 1980s this perception of the crisis (or more 
accurately successive and parallel crises) has come under increasingly 
forceful, intellectually persuasive and politically influential attack. The 
’’employment”, ’’production by the rural poor”, ’’human investment”, ’’basic human 
needs” strands of thought and policy which in the neo-liberal high noon seemed 
dead and buried have regrouped and in significant ways mutated and coalesced 
(in the North too - vide the forceful frontal attack on Thatcherism and its 
moral political economy in the Church of England’s Faith In The City).
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The reasons are again complex:
1. neo-liberalism had won its dominance by force more than by persuasion so 
that its opponents in most cases looked for ways to reverse the verdict 
rather than becoming full converts;
2. the re-emergent strands had in fact concentrated on efficient resource 
allocation, production by the poor and universal basic services to raise 
productivity and selective state intervention with decentralisation so 
that (unlike more orthodox - or procrustean - ’left’ formulations) they 
could fight neo-liberalism on its own ground;
3. the claims for rapid turnarounds and trickle down for all of the 
neo-liberal crusaders clearly did not come true; their initial African 
paradigmic examples of sound policies and success (e.g. Malawi, Cote 
d ’Ivoire) on examination turned out not to follow the supposed policies 
and - even more distressingly - performed increasingly badly in macro 
economic terms. Per contra the success cases in Asia turned out to 
practice detailed state investment, massive human investment and moderate 
redistribution!;
4. the social and political costs of neo-liberalism (or at any rate its 
rapid, acontextual, insensitive, ill-thought out application) proved 
severe and - even more crucially for elites - potentially explosive;
5. import model ideologies, weltanschaungs, policies and praxis backed by 
financial force were deeply resented by most African decision takers 
creating a fertile constituency for acceptance (and attempts to act on) 
alternative conceptualisations, strategies and - at the least - social 
and political tension reducing programmes.
The international spokesorganisations for this counter-attack - it still is 
not clearly more than that - have been UNICEF ("Adjustment with a Human Face") 
and - more cautiously - ILO ("employment", "informal sector", "human
investment", "basic needs" revisited and jointly reformulated). However, 
there is a considerably more varied and evident domestic South (intellectual 
and political-intellectual activist) support for and contribution to the
process today than in the middle and late 1970s when one often had, e.g. 
African concepts and approaches rephrased and refomulated by "proxy Africans" 
to the extent that they were - except in Southern Africa - frequently not only 
unrecognisable but also unacceptable to their original creators and 
implementers.
This conceptualisation is radically different from the neo-liberal vision. It 
- albeit if largely formulated by economists (even in the UNICEF case) and 
overly economistic in vocabularly and initial action justification - perceives 
the common element in the crises as being the human condition of poor (at the 
extreme dying) people individually and in specifically identifiable social 
groups. Human beings are reinstated as the subjects (not objects or targets) 
of development and their condition (and especially its direction of change) as 
the measure of crises and justification (or damnation) of economic policy and 
praxis.
Emerging Foci and Divergences
The basic convergence is among basic human needs as an over-riding target and 
universal access to basic services combined with more production by/fairer 
payment to the poor as the main (and economically consistent) ways to achieve 
them with the human investment for productivity approach (itself originally 
neo-classical and associated with a fraction of neo-liberalism).
This approach has been designed to refute the claims that while poverty and 
misery (up to and including premature death) may be deplorable "There Is No 
Alternative". In the process it has created a politically saleable message 
(vide the response to Band Aid and its extended family or at both grassroots 
and establishment level to UNICEF, the only UN agency able to finance steady 
and rapid expansion of existing and new programmes) and, potentially, a way to 
convert immediate emotional human concern into longer term backing for 
rehabiliitation, recovery and redevelopment after survival.
There is not complete synthesis of the approaches nor tactical coherence. 
Production by the poor has encountered much more resistance (intellectually 
and by, e.g., the World Bank) than universal access to basic services - 
apparently because the latter can be formulated more generally, elegantly and
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econometrically and is consistent with some strands within traditional 
neo-classical economies. Similarly "human investment" - as a result of its
origins and of the fact that middle and higher level personpower who (at least 
once trained/educated) are not/will not be poor - is not always clearly or 
self-evidently related to the short run human condition of poor majorities and 
of fractions within these majorities.
The initial tactical target was people made poorer or more vulnerable by 
stabilisation and adjustment programmes. This did have the advantage of 
putting the Bank - and to a lesser extent the Fund and some bilateral agencies 
- on the defensive. (Rising malnutrition and, a fortiori, infant mortality 
linked to ones own programmatic advice are somewhat difficult to defend even 
if one is certain they are unavoidable.) In fact at that level at least
verbally (and to a lesser degree progammatically) the battle is being won. 
Virtually all relevant bodies say that the human condition effects of
stabilisation and structural adjustment measures must be seen as important and 
if otherwise sound policies cause deterioration additional programmes/measures
to offset them must be undertaken. (As the Bank collaborated in raising
$40-50 million for the initial phase of Ghana's PAMSCAD which was marketed as 
such a programme, even if designed with a broader human condition backdrop, it 
is not all rhetoric.)
However, three limitations confront any approach focused primarily on the 
"victims of stabilisation and adjustment" (or even the poor among them - 
bankrupted formerly rich parallel marketeers, more pungently describeable as 
"two-legged wingless vultures", presumably worry few other than themselves and 
their close associates):
1. it is very hard to link most general human condition deterioration to 
stabilisation/adjustment programmes per se as separated from the crises 
which led to these programmes especially as the counterfactual 
progression in the absence of the programmes is often very hard to 
formulate credibly except as a downward path;
2. no programme designed to offset costs of adjustment can be expected to 
address the basic requirements of all poor and/or vulnerable people nor 
to be more than an "add on" (or Christmas tree decoration);
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3. if the human condition is the key test, then how it changes for all 
people (especially all poor and vulnerable people) - whatever the reasons 
for their initial poor condition - is the central justification or 
damnation of any applied economic strategy and the means to passing the 
test are necessarily integral to strategic design, not add ons.
The Human Dimension and Human Rights
Any approach to development (or any other branch of applied political 
economy) inevitably has a positive or negative human rights 
component. Any approach centering on the human dimension has an 
inherent commitment to human rights. Whether to all human rights, 
with what priorities and to what extent is a more complex (and 
ultimately contextual) question.
The standard divisions between individual and communal, socio­
economic and civil, hortatory and enforceable and resource expensive 
and no resource cost human rights are distinctly unhelpful in 
examining the human dimension approach in relation to human rights. 
Indeed attempting to do so strongly suggests that these supposed 
distinctions are objectively misleading and serve the subjective
purpose of selective opposition to human rights and regimes opposed
on quite different grounds not of supporting or enhancing human 
rights holistically defined.
Virtually all human rights are both individual and communal,
basically for the moderately self evident reason that human beings 
live in societies and interact with each other. Freedom of speech is 
usually categorised as individual. Yet it has meaning only in a
community context (of auditors and answerers). Food security is 
usually classified as communal but eating enough to avoid hunger or 
starvation is equally surely a very individual need.
Similarly, socio-economic and civil rights interpenetrate. Poverty 
and lack of education have a very negative impact on ability to
exercise civil liberties. Prevention of freedom of speech, of 
organisation and of political participation frequently cripple socio­
economic programme design, mobilizing power, implementation and error 
correction feedback even if objectives are genuinely related to 
socio-economic human rights. In this case the categories are not
meaningless but the assumption of inherent contradiction rather than
of basic {even if not told) complimentarity is wrong.
•
Whether rights are hortatory or enforceable is a contextual question 
and one with both political economic (resource availabilty and 
allocation) and socio political (political and legal norms and
institutions/processes) aspects. In most countries freedom from 
hunger/food security is in principle enforceable and in practice 
hortatory with uneven backing to putting the rhetoric into reality. 
The resource problem is one of priority in allocation plus 
practicable delivery (subsidy or gift? access to earned income? 
capacity to grow more?) problematics. The socio-political may either 
be of norms (how repugnant is the hunger of others? how strong the 
commitment to a right to eat for each and all?) or of institutions 
and laws (ie of affective accountability). But the same is true of 
effective freedom of speech ie the resources and mechanisms for most 
individuals actually speaking so that their desired audiences can
hear them either do not exist or are otherwise allocated. Similarly 
the norms against and structures to prevent communications 
oligopolisation or monopolisation appear rather weak in almost all 
countries even if the precise nature of quasi-accepted monopolists or 
oligopolists varies.
The resource cost distinction is a variation on the preceeding one. 
Again it does not hold up. Freedom from torture is regularly cited 
as no cost. In fact very often that is not the case. Properly 
equipped, trained and remunerated police, judicial and prison systems 
are expensive. So is unresolved and unsanctioned crime. Torture (no 
matter how morally unacceptable nor, for that matter, how ultimately 
disfunctional) can be seen as a low resource cost shortcut. 
Similarly if freedom from hunger in a given context requires low cost 
means to enable poor farmers to produce, eat and sell more food and
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urban workers to earn more and buy more food the macro economic 
results can be very resource positive (ie more resources generated 
than used) even in the quite short run.
The human dimension approach has not systematically addressed human 
rights questions under that rubric. But it has made specific 
propositions which demonstrably go beyond the charicaturisation of 
"bread and circuses" sometimes applied by critics of poverty 
reduction oriented strategies:
a. the identification of actual groups of actual poor people;
b. on regional, occupational and gender as well as specific unmet
needs bases;
c. the repeated insistence on participation and self organisation 
and expression by poor people.
As even the opening quotations from the Khartoum Declaration show, 
there are certain problems. The increased participation is sometimes 
viewed as "given" (a noblesse oblige not a rights approach) and there 
is evidently a perceived need to sell participation and organisation 
on productivity (avoiding errors, increasing mobilisation) rather 
than normative grounds and to smuggle accountability in without 
actually using the word.
But the contrast to "modernisation" - let alone "neo liberal" (whose 
main human rights concept is that free markets make free men) 
development conceptualisation and declamation is marked. 
Participation, women, identifiable poor people communally and 
individually are all to the center of the agenda and at least in 
principle perceived as having the right to speak for themselves and 
to be listened to.
Before addressing accountability, external agency roles and the scope 
for legal processes and personnel it may be useful to set out a more 
articulated presentation of the human dimension conceptualisation and 
strategy as it has emerged and evolved in the African context. The
*- 1 0 -
African focus is not meant to imply that there are not parallel 
trends elsewhere in the South (or for that matter the North) but that 
contexts are important, and to acknowledge that the author's 
contextual expertise (or at any rate experience) is primarily Sub- 
Saharan African.
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An African Overview
The human condition - the social fabric of people’s lives, the state of their 
cooking pots - is the ultimate test of development. It is also among the 
vital means to achieving it. The malnourished, the sick, the illiterate, 
those worn out carrying wood and water cannot work long, hard or very 
productively. To waste much of Africa’s basic economic factor of production - 
the work of its women and men - by allowing them to remain locked in 
vulnerability, enforced overwork or enforced idleness and poverty is not just 
a human and social failure; it is also gross economic inefficiency.
But the reality of what is happening today is starkly summed up in a 1985 
UNICEF poster of a young African girl. "'W’nat do you want to be when you grow 
up?” ’’Alive". For millions of our infants and young children over tine past 
decade it is a plea which has gone unanswered. They are prematurely dead. 
Unless the right to live can be made real no other human rights are possible - 
for the dead there is neither a future nor future access to other rights.
The average human condition of our fellow Africans - women and men, the young 
and the aged, peasants and urban slum dwellers, the ill and the crippled, 
displaced victims of drought and of war - is appalling. Worse, it is not 
improving - as in most countries it was, however slowly, prior to 1980. It is 
worsening. The rips in the social fabric are lengthening, the cracks in the 
pots are widening.
These facts are statistically known from a wide range of indicators: infant 
mortality and life expectancy, malnutrition and food supplies, access to pure 
water and to sanitation, illiteracy and access to education, income per 
household and environmental degradation. They are sharply illustrated by the 
tables and figures annexed to this paper. The stark reality is that the 
fabric of many African societies - national, regional and local - has been 
wrent. The cooking pots of millions have been broken. To pretend otherwise 
is to deceive ourselves and to betray the poor and vulnerable people; the 
women, the children, the displaced victims of drought and war, the poor 
peasants and the equally poor urban slum dwellers.
-12-
People As Actors - And Scriptwriters
No nation can be great and prosperous the majority of whose people are poor 
and miserable. Those words of Adam Smith set out a central truth which many 
of his disciples now preaching sermons in Africa and at Africans would do well 
to ponder on and to use as a test of their own proposals.
The human condition of individual people, of families, of communities and of 
societies is - as Mwalimu Julius Nyerere has put it - the only ultimate 
objective, justification and validation of development. Human beings are ends 
not objects, actors not things to be manipulated. Of course increased command 
over material resources - gross domestic product to use macroeconomic 
terminology - matters for a nation as well as a household. Food and health, 
education and water, sanitation and environmental protection all require real 
resources. Of course balancing income and expenditure - closing external and 
fiscal imbalances - matter nationally as well as individually. Crushing debt 
and demeaning begging damage the human condition. Of course choices and 
sacrifices need to be made by states and societies as well as by families and 
individuals. The need to provide for tomorrow and the duty to the rising and 
future generations are central to African thought and society. But these 
things matter because of what they mean for human beings - and especially for 
poor and vulnerable human beings - not in isolation from, or worse yet instead 
of, their impact on the human condition.
But if people are actors - participants - then they are also in a basic sense 
means. Means to achieving improvements in their human condition through 
economic recovery and development. Labour and land are two of the three basic 
factors of economic production. From work applied to natural resources the 
third - capital can be won. Created and embodied in productive assets: tree 
crops and transport systems, improved fields and power plants or dams, 
hospitals or health posts and factories, houses and shops, schools and mines. 
But the poverty, the malnutrition, the inadequate access to education of a 
majority of the people of Africa increasingly weaken their ability to work 
long, hard and productively. Their poverty increasingly forces them to abuse 
and destroy the land so the bone white of ruined, dead and dying land creeps 
wider across earth satellite pictures like the destroying cancer it is. By 
rending the fabric of society, growing immiserisation is equally surely 
breaking the cycles of production, of reproduction and of surplus generation
-13-
and creating contexts in which all human rights - however defined - are always 
in danger of erosion or extinction.
To regard nutrition, health services and education as the fruits of 
development to be deferred until after high production is self-defeating. Only 
the well nourished, healthy and literate can consistently and increasingly be 
efficient productive workers. To see access to pure water, reduction of 
women's workload and child survival as goals for after economic recovery is to 
ensure that there will be, at best, delayed and stunted recovery. Women worn 
out carrying water for miles, tending sick children and bearing replacements 
for those prematurely dead are not merely denied their rights as human beings 
but drained of the time and energy to produce more.
Similarly to restore and to expand output requires the fuller participation in 
production of the poor - not their exclusion from it. To provide tractors and 
large irrigated farms for the few and to ignore matchets and jembes (cutlasses 
and hoes) and improved seeds for the many is economic madness. Not only will 
it not solve malnutrition (the poor will have no means to buy food); it will 
not even restore a viable trend rate of growth of agricultural output.
Of course there is a need for balance. Production matters. It requires 
exports as well as textbooks; lorries as well as basic drugs; efficient 
factories as well as (indeed to produce) jembes and matchets; taxes as well as
protected wells. The point is not to argue for basic services instead of
production or production by the poor instead of by the not so poor. It is to 
point out that most present stabilisation and adjustment plans do the reverse: 
they fail to recognise the vital role of basic services and of production by 
the poor without which recovery will be limited and development (even in
narrowly economistic terms) virtually unattainable.
Stabilisation, Adjustment: And or Instead of Restoring The Human Condition?
Economic malaise, crises and decline have weighed most heavily on poor and
vulnerable people. There are several reasons for this - none of which is 
surprising but, equally, none is inevitable.
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When government resources are reduced provision of basic services and 
maintenance of infrastructure are cut back. They are usually cut back from 
the periphery - the feeder roads first, the capital city highways last. When 
health services face resource crisis usually rural health posts and clinics 
are hit first and central reference hospitals last. It is to the credit of 
some African states, medical services and communities (and their external 
cooperating partners) that there are exceptions to that pattern - in some 
cases the basic rural and low income urban health services have largely been 
sustained or even, in some respects, strengthened. But in general the greater 
the distance - geographic, gender, indigenous ethnic, social, economic or 
political - from the centres of power, the greater the cutbacks.
Similarly when production falters it is the vulnerable who lose their 
employment, see the product of their self-employment fall, have their 
entitlement (income) to food torn away. They do not have the resources to 
ride out a crisis nor to give the flexibility to adjust to new ways of earning 
a decent livelihood. Most have indeed adapted - without that they would have 
died. But millions could not adapt; they (largely infants, children and 
victims of drought and war) have died. For the poor and vulnerable people of 
Africa death is very close - their margins above survival are often very 
narrow. As the proverb puts it - give a rich man less food and he will grow 
thin; give a poor man less food and he will die.
The crises of falling export earnings and import capacity; of eroding 
government revenues and inflationary deficits; of inefficient policies and 
under-utilised capacity are very real. But they are not more real nor more 
important than the crises of rising numbers living in absolute poverty with 
rising infant mortality; of the re-emergence of killer diseases like yaws and 
yellow fever virtually eliminated by the end of the 1950s; of school systems 
near collapse and peasants without tools or seeds. Indeed they are part of 
the same human crisis.
Therefore, one basic test of all stabilisation and structural adjustment, of 
all economic recovery and development programmes is whether they will improve 
the human condition - make poor people less poor and vulnerable people less 
vulnerable by making it possible for them to produce more and by increasing 
their access to basic services as well as their control over programme and 
policy formulation and ability to hold decision takers and professionals
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accountable. If a programme cannot pass that test in prospect or in operation 
it is fatally flawed and itself in need of structural adjustment or total 
redesign. This test is stronger than that sometimes proposed of whether the 
stabilisation and adjustment programmes are the basic cause of poverty (of 
course they are not) or of whether they address the problems of poor and 
vulnerable people directly injured by some of their components (important but 
inadequate). It is also a test of present, short term as well as future, long 
term results. Human condition recovery must go step by step with production 
recovery or neither is likely to be efficient or sustainable.
Because the plight of the poor and vulnerable is the most desperate and urgent 
it is useful to indicate more specifically who these people are. Most fall 
into seven groups:
a. victims of prolonged drought and/or ecological degradation whose previous 
sources of income have been wiped out;
b. poor - often female headed - households pushed by land shortages onto 
marginal or sub-marginal land - the pioneers and victims of the "rural 
sponge" effect which has to date limited the rise of open unemployment;
c. households in isolated or peripheral (to main centres) areas who are 
physically and institutionally at the end of the line for all goods and 
services (whether public or private sector) and usually suffer first and 
most severely from decreased flows;
d. small producers - usually primarily engaged in self-provisioning but also 
selling food even when they have a nutritional deficit, because it is 
their basic cash income source - who are unable to increase or even 
sustain ouput in the face of declining access to inputs and static 
relevant technological knowledge;
e. victims of war who are dislocated, like those of drought, with loss of 
access to health, education and water as well as of land, herds, homes, 
tools, seeds and foodstocks and plunged into a context of physical 
insecurity while government resources and physical capabilities are 
debilitated by war bills and destruction;
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f. "informal” urban sector members whose numbers have risen even as the 
incomes of the formal sector they served and supplemented fell and whose 
slum or exurb areas have become ever more crowded and ever less well 
provided with basic services;
g. urban wage earners - formerly above the absolute poverty line - whose 
real wages have plunged so sharply they and other household members have 
had to add on "informal" sector economic activities to limit the 
vertiginous fall in their living standards, indeed in many cases to 
survive at all.
The Slippery Slope Revisited
How the economies of most African states and the human condition of most
African people came to be so debilitated as they are today matters. It
matters not primarily to win debates or to apportion blame but to understand
how to win clear and "to look our mistakes squarely in the face lest we fall
into repeating them" as Rector Rui Balthasar Santos of Eduardo Mondlane 
University once put it.
The radical, general worsening of the situation dates to 1980. After very low 
growth over 1970-75, most African states made fairly rapid economic progress 
over 1976-79 and human condition indicators showed some - even if limited and 
unequally distributed - advances. Since then most of Africa’s economies have 
been on a declining path in terms of per capita output while poverty and 
vulnerability have been growing. Why?
One major answer - probably the dominant one so far as output per capita
declines in the majority of African states are concerned - is the 1979-1987 
evolution of the international economic environment confronting Africa. The 
1 9 7 9 - 8 2 recession and slow 19 8 3 - 8 7 recovery in the industrial economies have
9
had a disastrous impact on Africa's exports valued in terms of import 
capacity. Over 1976-81 a World Bank study showed several African economies -
e.g. the Cote d'Ivoire and Tanzania - as among the worst affected. Many 
primary products' real values (import purchasing power per unit exported) are
at 50 year lows and the recent slight recovery in metals and virtually all
projections give little promise of significant change. At the same time
protectionism and industrial economy dumping have hampered export
*-17-
diversification. The financial flow position has also worsened. Real net 
concessional finance per capita (grants and new soft loans less interest and 
repayment on old) declined sharply from the mid-1970s to early 1980s and - at 
best - have been stagnant since. Non-concessional flows have gone negative. 
Africa has a debt burden relative to exports greater than that of any other 
region - payment on present terms is not possible and the attempt to sustain 
it is dramatically limiting imports, choking off recovery and worsening the 
human condition. That is not the view of African governments, the ADB, the 
ECA and the OAU alone, analyses by the World Bank and the British Chancellor 
of the Exchequer come to the same conclusion.
Drought - on virtually a continental basis - has exacerbated the already 
unsatisfactory food production trend. After good years in 1985-86, 1987 has 
seen several localised droughts. Until food production levels in normal years
- especially by poor peasants - are much higher and vulnerability of output to 
drought is reduced, this scourge will regularly derail recovery efforts or put 
them into reverse.
For many African economies the macroeconomic and human costs of war are 
greater than those of any other exogenous shock. Nowhere is this as brutally 
clear as in Southern Africa. Angola and Mozambique production (excluding oil) 
is about half what it would be had South Africa not waged war against them - 
directly and by proxy. As detailed in UNICEF's Children on the Front Line by 
the end of 1986 1,000,000 human beings were already dead as direct or indirect 
results of the war, up to 12 million driven from their homes, up to 8 million 
in danger of starvation. By the end of this year the toll will be at least a 
third higher.
Other wars equally destructive of the human condition - including life itself
- are less exogenous. The wars of the Horn of Africa and of the Sudan and the 
disintegration of Uganda into a Hume (not a Locke, still less Rousseau) "state 
of nature" have roots which are deeply indigenous and in some cases centuries 
old. But even in these cases external action and inaction has greatly raised 
the potential for destruction and made resolution of the conflicts harder. 
The external actions include those of other African states as well as of great 
powers - e.g. Libya in Uganda and a fortiori Morocco's colonial conquest of 
the Sahara Democratic Republic’s soil.
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Not all causes of economic and human condition decline are exogenous. African 
governments have made policy mistakes and have been too slow in responding to 
the worsening external context. In all candour, however, it should be noted 
that many of these decisions were taken on external advice and are now 
attacked by those who once pushed them. However, with the adoption of APPER 
and of national rehabilitation, recovery and renewed development programmes by 
a majority of African states, there has been substantial improvement on the 
economic policy front. That again is not the judgement solely of the OAU or 
the ECA; the World Bank and the United Nations General Assembly have said the 
same.
However, these economic policies to date frequently do not give adequate 
attention to the human dimension nor enough priority to improving it, not 
simply to increase human welfare but also to sustain and accelerate economic 
growth. That is not a new weakness - it typified most development plans and 
programmes of the 1960s and 1970s. Then, however, with less constrained
resources and a less hostile international economic environment, the old 
export led, dependent, central city and high income group focused model was 
consistent with some improvement in human condition indicators in general and 
in basic services extension in particular. Today and tomorrow no such
compatibility is likely to be within the grasp of most Africa states. Either
the nature and priorities of development will be re-thought and acted upon on 
new premises or what economic growth there is will march hand-in-hand with 
rising levels of inequality and poverty, misery and instability.
One concrete example is health. Life expectancy is much lower and mortality 
much higher in Africa than in the industrial North. The largest single 
difference is in infant and under 5 mortality. These are 30% of all deaths in 
Sub-Saharan Africa but only 2 to 3% in most industrial economies. The main 
causes are neo-natal tetanus, five epidemic diseases (including measles, 
tuberculosis and polio), malaria, impure water related morbidity (including 
diarrhoea), and malnutrition linked diseases and/or loss of resistance to
disease. For older children and adults malnutrition and impure water related 
diseases, malaria, a handful of epidemic diseases and accidents treatable by 
first aid are the dominant killers.
Urban hospital care is largely irrelevant to reducing these death tolls in 
Africa - as it was in Europe. It takes 60 to J0% of the typical African
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health budget. Primary health care (including first aid), basic drug lists
and supplies, extended immunisation programmes, oral rehydration and simple
health education (including sanitation ) are of proven low cost effectiveness. 
But they receive 10 to 15% of the majority of African health budgets. The 
case for rethinking and reallocation is clear technically as well as in human 
rights terms. The warning of Cheik Amidou Kane is even more timely now than
when he first made it in 1985:
Frustrations and failure will mount if we do not immediately 
summon the courage to revise the ways we think and take action.
What Is To Be Done? Roads Back and Forward
To will an end is - if serious - to will a means or a set of means adequate to 
achieve that end. To make the human condition integral and central to 
Africa's economic recovery and development requires a comprehensive political 
and socio economic strategy encompassing at least eight elements:
a. recognition that people matter and are both the subjects and ends of and 
the main means and actors to attaining stabilisation, recovery and 
renewed development;
b. understanding that throwing away much of Africa's most basic factor of 
production - the labour of its people - as many modernisation and narrow 
stabilisation strategies do by excluding the poor and vulnerable, is 
economically wasteful and inefficient;
c. acting on the reality that marginal rates of economic as well as social 
return from enabling poor people to produce more are often high. The 
real problem is making small, contextual, poor people centred projects 
visible to central decision takers and credible to bureaucrats and 
analysts - and then altering regulations to be compatible with 
implementing them;
d. comprehension that health, education and pure water are not merely human 
and social goods (basic as that point is) but are important to 
maintaining present and raising future economic productivity and to
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making possible fuller participation in production by women who are the 
chief victims of illiteracy and the human beings on whose backs falls the 
burden of fetching water and caring for the sick;
e. focusing on employment and production, not subsidies and relief; e.g.
through public works programmes to relieve drought or seasonal income 
losses;
f. articulation of short term priorities to lay foundations for long run
sustained development; e.g. in applied, field tested, peasant user 
friendly, producer cost effective agricultural research begun now to make 
it possible to sustain 5% agricultural growth in the late 1990s. Until 
then input restoration, infrastructural rehabilitation and generalisation 
of best known farmer or (more rarely) off-the-shelf research techniques 
can restore 4 to 5% output growth - but not beyond;
g. political as well as economic awareness that participation in production
by poor people is crucial to underpinning their survival and the 
improvement of their human condition. Without it their social and 
political participation will remain limited and perpetually at risk;
h. comprehension of the extreme economic inefficiency of rending the fabric 
of society - strikes and riots, go-slows and loss of morale, steadily 
growing grinding poverty and recurrent economic disasters without human 
rehabilitation are devastating in narrow economic as well as social, 
political and human terms.
The poor and the vulnerable are not amorphous masses; they are groups of human 
beings. To fail to see what their needs are as perceived by themselves is to 
exclude them. To suppose their needs and capabilities are uniform is to 
render many people invisible. In no case have these errors and blindnesses 
been as common or as persistent as in that of women. Most African women are 
excluded or invisible but also over-burdened and under-assisted. The basic 
barriers to economic as well as human development posed by the excessive 
workload most African women bear are rarely recognised clearly. The 
implications of the gender division of labour in agriculture are yet to be 
taken account of by agricultural research and extension. These are central 
elements in any serious effort to improve the human condition. After all over
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half of our people are women and they care for our children and produce most 
of the food we eat. How to address them is not simple and varies from context 
to context. But three elements are crucial:
a. universal access - to literacy, to basic education, to primary health
care, to pure water, to agricultural inputs, to fuel - is 
disproportionately beneficial to women because when access is limited 
they are disproportionately deprived of them;
b. serious attention must be addressed to reducing women's workload - e.g.
by closer water and health facilities, by programmes (e.g. immunisation) 
reducing child illness, by improving technologies relevant to female 
tasks (e.g. food processing, moving water and fuelwood);
c. women should be centrally involved in planning and taking decisions about
projects and programmes which will primarily affect them, e.g. rural 
water supply and maintenance, sanitation, food crop research and 
extension.
To will a strategy should lead to addressing questions of method. To cross a 
river requires a bridge, a raft, a boat, a tunnel or a ford (or perhaps a very 
good swimmer!). The same is true of economic recovery and development 
strategies giving central priority to the human dimension.
It should be made clear that the three goals of standard stabilisation and 
structural adjustment strategies do matter. They are incomplete rather than 
irrelevant or inherently in the wrong direction. More production is crucial. 
But in addition more of it must be by poor people. Reduced external and 
fiscal imbalances are necessary - but priority should go to increasing supply 
and not cutting uses important to the poor and vulnerable. Bad policies and 
restrictions inhibiting production and especially poor people organising to 
better their own human condition should be done away with, but not in any 
false faith in the perfection of markets or universal goodwill of the powerful 
and rich.
But those elements are not, by themselves, enough. More are needed. These 
include priorities in government expenditure which include and move toward 
universality, e.g. more primary and preventative health care relative to
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hospitals and more food availability to poor people (through their own 
production or earning incomes adequate to buy it). That in turn requires much 
more emphasis on increased productive employment and self-employment.
The importance of moving to universal access to basic services has already 
been underlined. With it goes development of basic survival, disaster period 
support and rehabilitation mechanisms. Disasters will recur; the question is 
how to minimise their human damage and to speed the progress of rehabilitation 
- neither of which national nor (a fortiori) international disaster relief 
mechanisms have done very well to date. Again closely linked is acting on the 
perception that environmental and ecological protection is vital to the future 
human condition of poor Africans. Millions are being condemned to life 
sentences of poverty and to early deaths by the present pace of environmental 
degradation and destruction.
These priorities require both production and government spending. Budgetary 
balance should be restored and sustained primarily by increasing revenue. 
Domestically more production can allow more tax revenue and more efficient and 
progressive tax systems. But in the short run Africa needs additional 
external support. Additional support which meets the tests that accepts the 
primacy of African goals, respects the knowledge and judgement of Africans can 
be used to meet African requirements for improving their human condition 
through their economic recovery and development and is provided in a context 
within which African peoples and states can hold its agents accountable.
This conceptualisation is not - especially in this full-blooded and 
consistently articulated a form - dominant in Africa today. But neither is it 
absent or simply the importation of an external intellectual fad. In 
fragmentary forms, diverse formulations and different degrees of 
comprehensiveness and forcefullness it is both widespread and gaining ground 
from farmsteads to capitals, from the excluded to the intellectuals, from the 
marginalised to the powerful and in commitment and praxis as well as principle 
and prose. The Khartoum Declaration of March 1988 on the Human Dimension does 
embody priorities and perceptions which were not equally prominent even three 
years ago and however wide the gap between affirmation and action the 
movement is on both fronts not just affirmation.
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International Development Agencies As Disasters
It is easy to collect a catalogue of horror stories about 
international development actors - international financial 
institutions, bilateral agencies and ngo's. The question is to what 
purpose. Proving that human beings are often foolish, insensitive 
and self centered and that actual human institutions partake of these 
characteristics is certainly possible but perhaps, by itself, 
somewhat laborious representation of what few would deny.
Three possible uses are: a) reaffirming the "foreign devils" thesis;
b) 'demonstrating' that external actors are really engaged in
exploitation with or without a human mask (with sub-theses excluding 
or including socialist country based ones and/or ngo's); c) seeking 
to throw light on general participation and accountability problems 
related to external relief and development oriented actors. The 
present author is incompetent (as a "foreign devil" himself) to deal 
with "a'" and finds "b" either unrevealing or reductionist. 
Therefore, the present focus is "c".
In 1987 a major bilateral agency's emergency disaster relief mission 
arrived after a serious drought had broken. (Indeed floods impeded 
it' s movement!) Perplexed as to what to do it sought advice. 
Restoring a human drug reserve stock was accepted; creating an
analogous livestock one which could have reduced animal losses (the 
central cost of this country's droughts) 30 to 50% was rejected. 
Rehabilitation finance (to allow rebuilding herds or seed stocks) was 
ruled out as was rural water (human and livestock) rehabilitation and 
extension to reduce future vulnerability. In growing irritation,
with his ’advisors', the head of mission eventually burst out: "You 
do not understand ... disaster is our bread and butter".
Unfortunately this was not actually meant callously. But what does 
it say about coherent conceptualisation of human needs? Of
sensitivity to actual, specific interests? Of aid structure and 
institutional congruence with need structures and relationships?
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In 1986-87 an African country on advice from inter alia - there were 
domestic proponents - the Fund and Bank converted its central grain 
procurement corporation into primarily a minimum grower price 
(maximum wholesale price) guarantor buyer (supplier, ie importer) of 
last resort. 1985 and 1987 both produced bumper crops with large 
surpluses. Predictably the agency ran a large deficit on a cash flow 
basis and accumulated large stocks. Doubtless when a drought comes 
they can be sold but unless there is a huge consumer price increase 
(rather against the concept of basic food price stabilisation) 
procurement and storage/carrying costs will exceed proceeds. Further
interim exports - necessitated by storage limits and the logic of
optional reserve calculations - show immediate profit and loss as 
well as cash flow deficits.
The Fund had an 'easy' answer. It's advice could be paraphrased: 
don't buy the surplus grain or you'll break your credit trigger 
clause and will freeze your standby. The Bank rejected that but 
havered between calling for operating cost reductions (desirable but 
clearly unable to make an inherently non-commercial function
profitable) and allowing sharp intra-year grower price falls (on its 
own evidence likely to increase instability of grain planting and 
output). What does this say about the historic memory of these
institutions (1979-84 were drought and grain scarcity years in this 
country)? About their ability to work through the results of 
proposals (and sudden reproposals for reversing their earlier 
implemented ones)? About to whom they felt the state was accountable 
(themselves or small farmers)?
In a third country in 1988 several provinces experienced drought 
superimposed on externally organised terrorist war which dislocated 
people and prevented or limited production. A previous grain need 
target (endorsed by independent evaluators) had been 80% pledged and 
- perhaps - 70% (of commitment 55% of requirement) delivered. What 
issues did agencies raise:
a. was there a drought? Meteorology and detailed regional reports 
said yes. An independent observer hastily sent to one
controversial province said he was not technically competent to 
state whether it was a drought but with one sound ear of grain per
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hour of observation in a "grain basket" area it was as bad a crop 
failure as he had seen in over 25 years in Africa;
b. were flows intermittent and what (relaxed) detailed study was 
needed before acting? In the province in question 300,000 people 
were supposed to be receiving (free or at more or less landed cost 
prices depending on their economic group) 9 kilos a month of 
grain. Stocks were well under 3,000 tonnes and in 3 months only 
500 tonnes had arrived with no more in sight;
c. was 9 kilos a month too much for relief grain as surely some of
the recipients could grow or buy some food? The historic 
background is that 9 kilos is a WHO standard assuming 50% of 
calories readily available (physically and financially) from other 
sources. 15 kilos is the comparable WHO standard for refugees. 
On that basis the valid query was whether 75% of the over 3 
million relief recipients should be on the 15 kilo standard. In 
any case actual delivered pledges for the year appeared likely to 
come to perhaps 4 to 5 kilos per month!
d. why did capital city ration delivery remain erratic and what 
institutional reforms (by the recipient country) were needed? 
Initial stocks had been approximately nil. Arrivals were late and 
erratic. Many were tied to particular areas and/or to free 
distribution or sale - not freely useable to maintain continuity 
of supply. And then there was the "ship of weevils", condemned at 
another African country's port as unfit for human consumption (and 
potentially endangering local production if any reached growing 
areas) and sent on to be recondemned and cause a month's gap in
ration supply of that grain in the capital.
What does all this say about how agencies look at problems? 
Discrete, technical, fragmented or as aspects of a human condition 
challenge? About the standard of professionalism seen as needed in 
dealing with Africans and "recipients"? About sensitivity and powers 
of auto-criticism as opposed to self centredness and blaming the 
victim? About accountability and to whom? (A furious expatriate 
consultant remarked "I wish people who want to gamble with human 
lives would put theirs on the board too." His advice betrayed a
preference to gamble the waste of a few thousand tonnes of grain a 
two or three million dollars out of nominal totals of 600,000 and 
$350 million respectively and his analysis suggested that the other 
approached gambled at least 20,000 lives in one province alone.)
Finally (for this recital) in one African state a grain aid shipment 
arrived at the turn of the decade. It came from an area infested 
with the greater borer beetle - a maize eater. It was sent to 
certain rural districts. The next year two TNC grain marketers who 
examined grain at the port of shipment were fined huge sums for 
multiple fraudulent certification of infested grain. From that same 
year (and from the districts receiving the shipment) the greater 
borer beetle flourished until by 1986 it had reached half the country 
plus parts of at least five neighbours and was eating perhaps 100,000 
tonnes a year. The aid agency did not admit any responsibility nor 
did it take a lead in funding either containment or International 
Centre for Insect Pathology and Environment (ICIPE) 
biological/environmental control research. It's government, however, 
floated the rumour (clearly false) the grain had come from Nicaragua!
What does this have to say about accountability? About the ways and 
means actually open to a victim for pursuing the probable external 
cause of its grief? And taken with the "ship of weevils" about the 
'standards' deemed acceptable (or at any rate whose violation is 
merely venial) for food for Africans?
This is not a random list in the sense that the selection from a 
larger universe has a pattern. But the pattern is not selection of 
worst cases but of those which most clearly pose general questions. 
The other parallel pattern is that in each case aid agency personnel 
even from other bodies tend - with exceptions - to take view that 
these things are unfortunate, but mistakes do happen and to view deep 
anger at the cases or pattern as somewhat eccentric.
Some Implications
The basic problem does not appear to be ill will, professional 
inadequacy in the sense of real inability to think or to analyze, and 
any systematic desire (much less plot) to exploit. Three different 
factors pertain: a) inadequate information combined with a sloppiness
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aid agencies certainly would and do condemn in their clients or at 
best condone as evidence of their 'objective inability' to analyze or 
implement without firm external guidance and coordination; b) a 
belief in Platonic Guardianship by external actors 'free' from local 
prejudices, pressures and obligations and able to see what states, 
economies and people 'objectively' need and want better than they do 
themselves; c) total non-accountability (in any institutional sense 
and usually, apparently, in any sense of normative obligation as 
well) to the host state or people and relatively formal and routine 
own institutional accountability which does not focus on their impact 
on recipients1 human condition (nor, indeed, of performance by and 
welfare of recipients resulting from their actions or inactions).
Of these arguably the third is the basic problem. Domestic non­
accountability ensures freedom of maneouvre for Platonic Guardianship 
tendencies and blocks effective imposition of sanctions (or 
appropriate complementary domestic inputs to offset) lack of 
contextual and historic knowledge or failure to apply normal 
professional standards of competence, relevance and diligence. 
Unfortunately, the accountability problem is inherent in large 
institutional structures in general and even more so in ones financed 
and staffed from outside the country in which they operate.
Some Practical Issues in Accountability
Accountability nationally is fragmented, uneven and usually 
incomplete and feeble in SSA. Formal structural examination does not 
help understand many cases because the actual processes and 
accountabilities vary widely eg. the single Party states in Tanzania 
and Kenya afford very different degrees of power to enforce 
accountability to peasants absolutely and relative to other groups. 
Similarly ombudspersons, where effective of all, usually tend not to 
provide access to the poor who would otherwise have none but improved 
access for diligent middle class members who often could have used 
political or formal legal alternatives.
Further, severe processual problems arise especially among levels. 
Eg. a structure in which a political structure is relatively open and 
accountable from the base up and is explicitly superior to the
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governmental structures officially on the face of it should guarantee 
accountability. But three problems arise:
1. if each Party level can call each government level to account 
incoherence and wide divergences in praxis are likely but 
otherwise the base up then across and top down way of holding 
accountable is very cumbersome in respect to base community 
level;
2. contextual preferences and accountability and national 
coherence are hard to reconcile and it is not safe to assume 
either that the latter is trivial or that the closer to the 
base political or governmental institutions/personnel are the 
greater their concern with the human condition or feeling of 
responsibility to poor people (if anything the reverse seems to 
be the case on average though with a very wide scatter of 
particular cases);
3. acceptance of accountability and perception of responsibility 
does not lead automatically to meaningful acceptance of base 
level participation in operational policy articulation, 
formulation and decision taking still less to a guarantee that 
policies will in fact serve their intended beneficiaries well, 
cost efficiently or even at all.
The first two problems raise special problems if one seeks to ensure 
external agency accountability at base level. The third suggests 
that accountability many not, by itself, greatly increase efficiency.
Further, any external agency genuinely interested in accountability 
to its recipients/clients and especially to poor people and base 
level communities is certain to argue:
a. some states favour such accountability but do not have the 
capacity to make it meaningful and/or likely to improve 
programme performance;
b. others simply do not accept accountability to poor people or to 
base level communities themselves and are hardly likely to wish 
external agencies to do so;
c. even states with technical capacity and a commitment to 
decentralised accountability themselves may take a dim view of 
the type of external agency/local community/interest group 
political relationship genuine accountability implies.
These problems are real and cannot be ignored (especially not if or 
when the principle of accountability is accepted). Nor can it be 
safely overlooked that they provide a remarkably good alibi to 
agencies allergic to the concept, let alone the generalised practice, 
of accountability to clients. On the other hand - as the list of 
cases may suggest - the costs of non-accountability are high enough 
that even partial accountability, to governments at central level 
(perhaps with central interest group, or independent assessor 
involvement) in some countries would be a worthwhile achievement in 
human condition terms.
Especially for External Agencies
External agencies have very genuine problems in respect to accepting 
and operating client accountability. They already have
accountability structures to their governing councils and/or parent 
ministries. These are usually along standard inter-governmental 
organisation or national institutional lines. They do not (even when 
the council does include South governments) result in real 
accountability to any particular client on any specific issue even at 
national level. At best there is an openness to listen to client 
critiques and to try (on at best a voluntary normative responsibility 
basis) to respond to them. More rarely there is also involvement of 
clients in programme design and results monitoring.
It is much easier to criticise this pattern than to suggest 
alternatives. Multiple lines of accountability leading to very 
different institutions and groups will lead to conflicts and 
conflicting demands. How these can be minimised, guidelines for 
weighting different obligations devised and a workable conflict 
resolution procedure created is by no means self evident even in 
principle let alone in the context of an external agency in any one 
host setting and least of all across any away array of widely
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tdivergent host settings. Yet to make the attempt for some agencies 
in some host contexts is essential if operational progress is to be 
made.
Platonic Guardianship Revisited: The Bank as Ombudsman
One strand in the accountability debate goes in the opposite 
direction. Briefly put it contends:
1. most governments are not accountable to poor people or marginal 
social groups;
2. the bottom line is usually that their dominant decision takers 
(ruling sub-class coalitions) have no interest in, desire to be 
or feeling of obligation to be accountable to them;
3 Even if they would in principle accept accountability they lack
both technical capacity and length of time horizon to put 
accountability into practice efficiently and will be unable to 
defend it against powerful interest groups;
4. Therefore on selected issues (eg. indigenous minorities, 
environmental and ecological protection, birth rates) selected 
international agencies (eg. the World Bank) should be forced to 
be praxies for the poor and excluded and for the interests of 
future generations of their clients.
This is the Platonic Guardianship argument in a virtually undiluted 
form. (The dilution, if any, is that the proponents apparently wish 
to stand as intellectual Platonic Guardians to the Bank - in itself a 
somewhat implausible goal). Rarely, if ever, is serious direct 
accountability to the "beneficiaries" (especially, but not only, the 
future generations!) envisaged much less spelled out in operational 
terms. It is a positive encouragement if international/external 
agencies only too evident habit of seeking to bypass or control host 
channels. Ironically many of the advocates of this approach in 
selected cases are in general among its most vehement and cogently 
argued opponents.
A compromise is, perhaps, possible. Codes of conduct - including but 
not limited to accountability - could be drawn up by non-governmental
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international conferences including members of probable client 
(victim) groups as well as of support groups and technical experts. 
These could be adopted by the relevant specialised international 
agencies and forcefully recommended to host governments and external 
agencies. The latter, via their own accountability channels, could 
be required to adhere to the codes themselves and to decline to 
support host project or programme proposals flagrantly offending 
against them.
Three problems arise with this approach perhaps best exemplified by 
the WHO code in respect to human milk substitutes;
a. they are very effort and time consuming to achieve;
b. acceptance (and even more implementation) is very uneven; and
c. partly as a result of "b" sanctions for non-compliance are 
neither certain nor likely to be severe.
However - including in the case cited - there are some gains. One is 
that the codes do provide a focus, a legitimation and a mobilising 
force for domestic struggles for accountability. Another is that 
they may strengthen ad hoc voluntary accountability. A third is that 
in some cases national accountability structures (eg of certain 
bilateral and non-governmental development agencies) might take them 
on board with some degree of seriousness.
These caveats should not be misread as arguing that concerned 
individuals and agencies should do nothing to promote accountability 
until (unless) requested to do so by host governments. Several 
approaches are valid: advocacy; reaching out to and acting as
support groups for poor and vulnerable (or excluded and oppressed) 
groups of people; promoting and challenging internationally 
"accepted" standards especially those "accepted" by the state or 
state group itself (especially in this case the African convention on 
the rights and duties of states, individuals and peoples which can 
not incidentally be read as requiring accountability and whose mutual 
obligation and social groups' rights strands are by no means 
incompatible with, eg. social contract and indigenous minority rights 
principles and discourse).
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In doing so the risks of becoming a Platonic Guardian and of 
thwarting the process of building internal accountability and/or of 
misrepresenting those for which one is speaking need to be kept in 
mind. They are least for individuals speaking for themselves who 
have only the power (more accurately influence) of knowledge and 
persuasion. If they cannot convince significant domestic
'constituencies' they will be disregarded. NGO's (especially ones 
with accountability to principled and/or partly client 
constituencies), small international agencies and bilateral 
development cooperation agencies of states with no pretensions to 
global reach let alone major geo-political power are other moderately 
'safe' agents. They are unlikely to have the resource
provision/prevention power to coerce and while they may to a degree 
'buy' acceptance or testing of their principles this will be rare 
without there being some significant client constituency for them in 
the first place. Further, they normally have considerable leeway in 
selecting either whom they will work with or the balance of support 
for/nature of cooperation with different clients. Examples might 
include the United Methodist Church, Oxfam, The World Council of 
Churches, UNICEF, the ILO, national trade union federations, SIDA and 
CIDA, NORAD, FINNIDA.
The least 'safe' (and probably least credible) advocates and most 
dangerous enforcers are the political, economic, technical expertise, 
resource transfer big battalions. The most clear cut examples are 
USAID and its USSR counterpart, the IMF and the World Bank. This is 
largely an objective reality beyond these institutions control 
whatever their desires. Their own accountability structures and the 
interests of their dominant holders to account ensure that.
And So To Law?
The foregoing argument has not touched explicitly on the role of law 
or of lawyers. This is deliberate. Human rights and the human 
condition are not in their substance legal principles or concepts. 
The relevant issue is how law and lawyers can make a positive 
contribution to their gaining intellectual acceptance, mobilising 
support, formal adoption, institutionalisation, operation and 
enforcement. These are not trivial points nor can the concept of the
lawyer as translator without a professional and (secondary) 
substantive role be sustained. There is an equally important role for 
lawyers in contexts in which these principles are not accepted in 
using legal tactics, procedures and fragments of law to limit abuses, 
win skirmishes and cast the dominant normative/power/juridical 
structure into disrepute. South Africa is an extreme example of such 
a context- However, that set of roles lies outside the direct scope 
of this paper.
At the national level three clusters of issues or topics appear to be 
central:
a.) civil society and its room to organise and to act; b.) 
accountability and c.) access to channels designed to protect 
empowerment.
Civil society is used here as a shorthand for freedom of self organisation, 
self expression and action initiatives especially but not only at base level. 
It need not mean pluralism in the North American sense and is no more 
inconsistent (or at any rate antagonistically contradictory) with 
decentralised, democratic single mass (or just conceivably cadre) party 
systems than with bourgeois democratic structures.
The necessity of room for manoeuvre for civil society rests on two legs:
1. people in base communities or action groups have knowledge of their own 
needs and potentials no one else can;
2. unless poor people and marginalised groups are able to participate - in 
production, in mobilisation, in decision-taking and in calling
decision-takers (including their own leadership) to account there will be 
no objective and especially not institutional power base to protect their 
interests from counter-attacks by other interest groups who are organised 
(especially from bureaucrats, a sub-class ubiquitously part of governing 
coalitions whose interests in orderliness and a quiet life posit
cooperation with civil society if and only if it is well organised,
significant to the economy and able to inform the political process).
The legal implications apply both to national legal and administrative
regulation frames and to the consititutions and procedures of the civil
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society organisations. The latter are as much subject to the general 
considerations applying to constitutional law as are national constitutions 
and frame setting laws. Administrative regulations/procedures (whether in the 
form of administrative law nor not) are equally important because they can 
(and often do) give life or the kiss of death to statute law and political 
requirements to administrators. Laws and procedures cannot guarantee civil 
society life - they can protect or constrict, facilitate or prevent its 
emergence and development.
Accountability needs to be both prompt and effective and direct and 
decentralised. Dedicated political leaders who regularly go out to hear and 
listen to people’s voices can achieve all four but intermittently and on a 
fragmentary basis. Formal procedures on the other hand often have so many 
steps and safeguards as to be non-operational at best and at worst to be 
readily hijackable by those they are meant to hold accountable by them (e.g. 
British ’’police complaints” procedures and processes).
Again serious principle, practicability and practice legal issues arise at all 
levels from central government (and "leading role" single party) to civil 
society base groups (whose leaders and managers often show a dislike for 
accountability and a tendency to abuse power no less than that of their more 
prominent analogues at larger unit levels). There is a need for checks and 
balances - a system with no real safeguards or judicial (in the broad sense) 
for evaluating and resolving disputed charges is all too prone to sanctioning 
by mistake or, worse, to being used to purge precisely those who are committed 
to unpopular dimensions of improving the human condition and enhancing or 
protecting human rights.
Para legal approaches - e.g. ombudspeople and quasi-judical bunals (bi, tri or 
multi) also require study. In general they do not seem to add much to speed, 
effectiveness or openness except in the contexts of a broadly educated public, 
a strong civil society and pre-existing norms favourable to participation and 
accountability (all of which exist in their Scandinavian heartlands and offset 
equally entrenched tendencies to bureaucratic rigidities and to judicial 
processes heavily biased against defendants.
Access is a necessary focus if work relating to the other two is to prove 
lastingly and growingly operationally successful. The first requirement for
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access is a public and in particular base level civil society bodies which 
know what their legal, paralegal, processual and procedural rights are and how 
to exercise them. The second is a belief that seeking to exercise them will 
be substantively successful often enough, long enough to make it worth the 
bother and that failed good faith efforts (let alone blocked valid ones) will 
not bring savage reprisals - the ultimate flaw in many "police complaints" 
systems. The third is that procedures and processes do not have time and 
resource costs so high as to put well nigh unleapable hurdles in the way of 
all but the already powerful or the most doggedly committed. A related fourth 
requirement is availability of relevant legal expertise (whether from lawyers 
or para legal personnel and whether through traditional professional channels, 
standard legal aid, support groups or training of civil society group 
personnel at least to selective para legal level).
To posit these clusters is to identify the need for lawyers to rethink their 
relationship to human rights. The hired professional lawyer pursuing high 
profile civil rights cases to the highest appeal courts has a role - vide 
India. But he (or she) is either the visible apex of an iceberg, the 
mobilising example to pave the way for broader and deeper action or an 
isolated and ultimately ineffective artefact playing King Canute. The need 
for a judical process (whether in the formal mainline court system or 
otherwise) as a last resort to achieve redress and to impose sanctions when 
all else fails is irrefutable but last resorts should rarely be needed and 
usually serve excessively ill as standard procedures. Similarly the legal 
requirements for their use are very different from those of base civil society 
groups or day to day political and administrative accountability processes.
Law and International Accountability
At the international level the challenges are even more severe. Enforcement 
is usually seen as the main stumbling block but since one rarely reaches the 
position of having broadly agreed norms to enforce may in fact better be 
viewed as a last hurdle tackleable only after prior vaults forward have been 
attained.
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The areas for attention include:
a. participatory, accountable methods of formulating standards/codes of 
conduct for states and state entities and for international agencies and 
ngo’s in relation to specific human condition/human rights issues;
b. defining in a coherent, potentially practicable way the duties of
external bodies to hosts in respect to host state standards, 
international standards, host civil society. (Wholesale assertions of
extra-territorial powers for national legislation are open to severe
criticism. Even when the immediate object and impact are benificent they 
appear to ”do the right thing for the wrong reason” and by the wrong 
procedure.);
c. achieving mobilisation of civil society and of "converted” governments,
agencies and organisations to secure formal adoption of the results of
"a" and "b" processes by forums and in ways which will ensure them
normative legitimacy, some potential for national and institutional self 
enforcement and enough publicity to ensure potential users do know of 
their existence and how to ascertain ways of appealing to them. (The 
baby milk substitute code does meet these tests as does the quite
different Law of the Sea Convention);
d. divising and achieving methods for resolving disputes and enforcing
compliance/accountability which are widely enough accepted, prompt 
enough, adequately accessible and adequately predictable as to results as 
to be meaningful. (The ICJ process does not meet these tests, at least 
not beyond test cases in which its decision will have persuasive power to 
ensure numerous subsequent acts of compliance without further 
references).
As discussed above the inherent problems of parallel multiple accountability 
intra organisational, home state, home civil society, intra-governmental, host 
governmental and host civil society are by no means trivial. However, the 
issues of conflict resolution, checks and balances, due process and 
conciliation/equity are ones with which lawyers are familiar and on which they 
do (or should) have claims to special professional expertise. They are not 
inherently insoluble if the defined objectives advances from the status quo
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and acceptable, workable compromises (as opposed to Armageddon or the New 
Jerusalem now - both topics on which lawyers have little applied expertise and 
a rather poor drafting record).
Reflection and Prologue
The struggle for human rights/the human condition is part of the struggle for 
justice in history. Therefore its victories will always be partial, 
conditional, contextual and at risk. That does not make them less worth 
seeking and winning because it is not possible to operate outside or beyond 
history and the goals of most poor or vulnerable people and their 
organisations centre on finite, accessible goals, not martyrdom in the name of 
perfection. The latter like the showpiece test case taken to the apex of the 
judicial system (to win compliance, force legal reform or discredit the 
system) has its place but not when willed on the martyr by outsiders nor as a 
standard operating procedure.
But much the same can be said of the law (as an embodiment of substantive 
norms and of procedural due process), of particular laws (as means to secure 
certain objectives - ideally with minimal use of the courts), of judicial 
cases (civil, administrative or criminal and in mainline courts or 
complementary analogues) and of the legal profession.
This paper has focused on the human condition in the context of the present 
human crises in Africa. Unless economic rehabilitation and development as 
usually defined today are broadened to make the human condition - and 
especially the human condition of poor people - central and integral, African 
economic recovery will be stunted and African economic development 
unsustainable. The challenge of turning around the post-1979 (or earlier for 
some countries) decline is a heavy one. But it must be accepted, and accepted 
in a way which makes human rights central and perceives participation and
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accountability central to their attainment and defence. A proverb from the 
Mara Region of Tanzania cited by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere in his opening address 
to the South Commission is appropriate:
Rabbit, where are you going?
I am going to kill the Elephant!
Can you do it?
Well, 1*11 try and try again!
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TABLE 1
SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS: 
1960 - mid-1980s (a)
Ghana
Late Low Income sub-
1960 1970 1970s 1980s Saharan Africa
1. Average Life Expectancy 
at Birth 45 49 55 53
(1982)
48
2. Infant Mortality Rate 132 107 86 107-120 118
3. Child Death Rate 27 21 15 25-30 24
4. Access to Health 
Facility (b) - - - 30 45
5. Public Health Facility 
Visits Per Person 
Per Year 0.7 0.4 2(f)
6. Health Budget as 
% of GDP - 1.2 - 0.26 0.95
7. Access to Pure Water (c) 
Rural 
Urban 
Total
-
14
86
35
14
86
35
48
75
60
14
62
22
8. Access to Excreta 
Disposal (d)
Rural
Urban
Total
-
40
92
55
40
95
56
30
65
44
25
69
32
9. Average Calorie Avail­
ability as a % of 
requirements 92 97 88 68 91
10. Child Malnutrition 
(Moderate/Severe) - - 36 50-55 40
11. Primary Education 
Enrolment Ratio (e) 38(46) 64(75) 69(80) -(80) 69(-)
12. Adult Literacy 27 30 - 35-45 44
13- Education Budget as 
% of GDP - 3-9 - 0.85 2.81
14. Proportion of Population 
Below Absolute Poverty 
Line (f)
Rural
Urban
- - 60-65
30-35
67-1/2-
72-1/2
45-50
65
35
Principal Sources
World Bank, Comparative Analysis and Data Division, Economic 
Analysis and Projections Department (June 1984), World 
Development Report 1985; UNICEF, Statistics on Children in 
UNICEF Assisted Countries (April 1985); UNICEF Ghana: Situation 
Analysis of Women and Children (July 1984).
Notes
a) 1960 data refer to a year between 1959 and 1961; 1970
between 1969 and 1971; late 1970s between 1975 and 1980; 
1980s to 1982, 1984 or 1985.
b) Defined in terms of location within a 5 kilometre radius. 
Hay overstate for urban population when facilities
available are small.
c) 1970 and late 1970s urban figures may be overstated by
failing to relate number of water points to population.
d) 1970 and 1978 figures for urban and possibly rural areas 
overstate by failing to relate number of drop-holes to
supposed user population.
e) Adjusted for length of primary cycle. ( ) are unadjusted 
figures. Because of the primary/middle school division 
Ghana has a shorter primary cycle than most SSA countries.
f) Estimate made by author based on fragmentary data.
TABLE 2
SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS - SOUTHERN AFRICA 1984 AND SOMALIA
Angola Botswana Lesotho Malawi Mozambique Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe Somalia8
Population (millions) 8.5 1.1 1.5 6.9 14.0 0.6 22.0 6.5 8.5 5.5
Under-5 mortality
(per 1,000 births) 325-375a 100 145 280 325-375a 185 185 135 120 174-210
Infant mortality (0-1)
(per 1,000 births) 200a 75 110 160 200a 125 110 85 75 146-180
Infant and child
malnutrition (%) NA 32 NA 31 NA NA (50) 28 NA 16
Average calorie intake -
relative to
requirements (Í) 87 (94) 100 97 79 (108) 101 89 89 (105)
Access to health services (30) (89) NA 80 (30) NA (70) 75 71 (20)
Access to safe water 21 (76) (14) (41) (13) 48 (47) 46 (52) 33
Primary enrolment
{%) (1982)° 66 76b 71 46 46b 84b CO
 CT 94 131 15
Adult (over 15)
literacy (%) (1982) 28 61 70 (36) 27 (61) 85 69 69 16
One-year-olds fully h
vaccinated (í) TB 40 70 91 72 (46) 95 (84) 87 88 31
DTB 8 82 59 66 (56) 79b (58) 49 68 22
Polio 55 77 64 68 (32) 60b (56) 47 63 22Measles 62 75 63 64 (32) 51 (82) 56 55 36
Life Expectancy at birth (41) 55 50 46 (45) 54 52 52 56 45-49
GNP per capita 490 960 530 180 (230) 790 210 470 760 (350)
( ) = 1980 (or nearby year). Somalia re-estimated to include unrecorded remittances.
a Re-estimated on fragmentary data taking into account impact of war. Standard projections showing 245 under-5 
mortality for Angola and 255 for Mozambique assume continuation not reversal of rapid 1975-1980 immediate 
post-independence period gains.
c 1983Net ratios except for Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Includes etimates from various unpublished UNICEF studies at various dates 1982 through 1986.
Source: Statistics on Children in UNICEF Assisted Countries, UNICEF, 1986, The State of The World's Children 1987,
Oxford for UNICEF, 1987, except for GNP per capita taken from World Bank World Development Report 19 8 6, OUP.
TABLE 3
RATES OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGREDATION
Sand dune Deterioration Deterioration Rainfed
encroach­ in Forest of agricultural General
Countries ment rangelands depletion irrigation problems assessment
Benin 0 i ft 0 ft ft
Burkina Faso 0 • ft ft •ft ft
Cape Verdi • • ft •ft • /•ft
Chad «§ «« ft ft* «• • ft
Djibouti • •ft • ft NA • /•ft
Ethiopia • «« «« ft • • /•ft
Gambia • • • ft • ft • ft
Ghana 0 * ft • ft
Guinea 0 0 ft ft • ft ft
Guinea Bissau 0 0 ft ft • ft
Kenya
Mali * 
o «ft
»»
• ft 
«ft
ft
ft
•
•
ft
• /ft* 
• ftMauritania ft «« • ft ft •
Niger ft «« ft «• •M
• /•ft
ft
Nigeria 0 • ftft ■ftftft • ftSenegal « ft# ft ft ft ft
Somalia • ft ft ftft ft
Sudan ft* ft ft ft ft ft
Tanzania 0 ft ft 0 ft ft
Uganda o ftft o ft ft
United Rep.Cameroon 0 ft ft 0 ft ft
Zimbabwe 0 ft ft 0
KEY: o = Stable, * = Some increase, ** = Significant increase, NA = Not appplicable
Source: (Adapted) "Desertification Control Bulletin", United Nations Environment Programme,
Number 10, May 1984, p. 26 and national data.
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Figure 1  t r a in  production per capita in 24 African countries affected by drought. 1970-1984
1970 1975 1980 1984
S.,n r., SN or id Bank. T im a r  J  S u U a in r J  D e \e lu p m ,n i  /<i S u h -S a h a ra n  M m  a -1 Jo in t P rogram  4. lion I SS ashington. D (. . I9S4). p 14 based on dala 
ol i tic »,hk1 and Sericulture Organization of the L  nited Nations i f  \ O l .  except that the 19*4 figure is a projection using data from f  A O . the I  nited 
S t a t e s  Scenes lor International Development and the I  nited State's Department ol Agriculture
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x
t
fig u re  2  Index o f food production per capita. 1961-1965—  1983
t IV b l-1965 average = lOOl
average
Source  Vkorld B jn k . Toward Sustained  Development tn Sub-Saharan  A frica A Jo int Program o f Action  (W ashington, D C .  1984). p 15. based on data 
presided b> the L nned States Department of Agriculture
MALNUTRITION AMONG CHILDREN IN BOTSWANA AND GHANA 1980-84
Botswana
Percentage aged 1-4 years below 80 per cent of the 
H arvard standard w eight for age.
22 —1
Ghana
P e rce n ta g e  aged  7-42 m onths be lo w  80 per cent of the 
H arva rd  standard  w e ig h t for age
Sources: 
"Background  
Papers for 
W orkshop on Social 
and Nutritional 
Surve illance in 
Eastern and  
Southern A frica  
UNICEF Social 
Statistics Bulletin 
Vol. 5. No 4 1982
Source Catholic 
Relief Services 
G hana
Source: UNICEF, Adjustment With A Human Face, 1985.
Annex B
Excerpts from The Khartoum Declaration
This declaration was adopted by the UN system sponsored, UN Economic 
Commission for Africa organised and led International Conference on the Human 
Dimension of Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development in March 19 8 8. It was 
subsequently endorsed by the conference of African ministers responsible for 
’’human resources” and the 30th Anniversary ECA Council of Ministers meeting 
held in Niamey in April 19 8 8.
The Khartoum Declaration 
PREAMBLE
2... The Conference made a deep and detailed analysis of the African 
situation, particularly the current economic crisis and all its ramifications 
on the people of Africa. The Conference is unanimous in its conviction that 
the crisis that confronts the African continent is one that affects the total 
human condition of the continent and its people, men and women alike. It is a 
crisis that challenges the very survival of the African people. It is a 
crisis of Africa’s environment as the desert rapidly overcomes the fertility 
of the land and the coastlines also recede. It is a crisis of the continent’s 
natural resources exploited more for the benefit of external interests than to 
meet Africa’s dire needs. It is a crisis of the rich cultures of the African 
people and the cohesion of families broken up by the desperate circumstances 
of the African reality. It is a crisis that threatens to overwhelm Africa and 
her people and, in extremis, to reduce them to the helpless gaze depicted in 
the starving faces of Africa's children in the international media. But it is 
a crisis that can and must be overcome through the concerted and determined 
action of the African people and their societies and States, as they develop a 
clearer understanding of the implications of the current predicament and 
fashion a decisive and coherent plan of action, with the assistance and 
understanding of the international community.
We are encouraged in this view by the fact that although Africa has been 
sorely squeezed by the pressures of recent years and millions of Africans have
/
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suffered severely, no objective observer can fail to be impressed by the 
vitality, and human creativity which strive and flourish in spite of 
everything. The large cutbacks and constraints of government and urban 
production have stimulated communities to devise their own solutions to the 
problem of meeting their own basic human needs. Self-help groups abound in 
every country; the extended family, though strained, has often provided the 
means of survival of many of its members; examples of community action can be 
found in almost every village. It is important to recognize the enormous 
potential of the human energy and creativity and find ways to harness it 
rather than ignore it in the total process of national recovery and 
development. For these and other reasons we repeat that Africa’s crisis, 
though dire, CAN AND MUST BE OVERCOME
4 . ^  As participants in this event, the overwhelming majority of whom come 
from the African continent, we are moved to place on record our collective 
voice on the issues we discussed and we accordingly make this KHARTOUM 
DECLARATION.
A. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE HUMAN CONDITION IN AFRICA
5.W* Since the human being is the centre of all development, the human 
condition is the only final measure of development. Improving that condition 
is essential for the poor and vulnerable human beings who comprise the 
majority of our peoples in Africa. Africa’s men and women are the main 
factors and the ends for whom and by whom any programme and implementation of 
development must be justified.
6.W Regretably, over the past decade the human condition of most Africans 
has deteriorated calamitously. Real incomes of almost all households and 
families declined sharply. Malnutrition has risen massively, food production 
has fallen relative to population, the quality and quantity of health and 
education services have deteriorated. Famine and war have made tens of 
millions of human beings refugees and displaced persons. In many cases, the 
slow decline of infant mortality and of death from preventable, epidemic 
diseases has been reversed. Meanwhile the unemployment and underemployment 
situation has worsened markedly.
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7. yv^  Acts of destabilization and aggression, being perpetrated against the 
countries of Southern Africa by the South Africa regime, have also imposed 
massive human and economic costs, greatly in excess of military budgets or
battle casualties. Of the approximately one million human beings dead in
Southern Africa as a result of South African aggression over 1980-86 about one 
hundred thousand were war-dead, narrowly defined. Of the approximately thirty 
billion dollars in lost production, most relates to the creation of chaos and 
the loss of peasants’ crops and national production.
8.iV Production and other economic aspects of development - especially 
distribution - are of crucial importance. Production by the poor is vital if
they are to become more able to meet at least their basic needs. But it is
just as important who produces what. Production of food, of basic consumer 
goods, of agricultural inputs and construction materials, of basic services 
such as health, education, and pure water, as well as of exports are central 
to improving the human condition. Unsustainable imbalances do matter.
9.yV Nutrition imbalances are as crucial as trade imbalances. High infant 
mortality requires just as immediate and as serious an attention as high rates 
of inflation or huge budget deficits. Ultimately the trade, inflation and 
budget imbalances are serious obstacles to development because they are 
barriers to enabling the poor to produce more; to the vulnerable to surviving 
and rehabilitating themselves; and to the state and the society achieving 
universal access to basic services.
10. y*- Therefore, a basic test for all stabilization, adjustment and 
development programmes is whether they will improve the human condition from 
their inception or, on the contrary, worsen it. Social services and human 
resources development programmes have high short-, medium- and long-term 
payoffs on economic as well as on broader development criteria.
11.V W  They are relevant to the reversal of unsustainable imbalances since 
survival and rehabilitation assistance to the most vulnerable groups - 
international refugees and displaced persons, disabled persons, youth, women 
and children - is an important element in reversing production losses. 
Similarly, the engagement of Africa's most basic resource - its approximately 
250 million economically active people - in production, is essential to 
restoring growth as well as development.
1 2 . ^  The human-centred strategy to the implementing of the Lagos Plan of 
Action, APPER and UN-PAERD is vital for reaching out to the aspirations and 
needs of Africa’s people and especially their poor and vulnerable majorities. 
It is deliverable through the appropriate mobilization, allocation and use of 
resources. To bring this about it will be essential to restore the strained 
and torn fabrics of our societies, make popular participation in 
decision-making processes effective, ensure the preservation of basic human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and eliminate policies that discriminate 
against minorities and vulnerable groups.
13-y/ Progress in advancing the human condition in Africa depends on the 
structure, pattern and political context of socio-economic development. The 
problems and weaknesses in these areas must therefore be recognized and
attempts must be made to tackle them in order to achieve the objectives of 
social and human development. This is also necessary because the economic 
crisis which Africa faced from the late 1970s found fertile ground in the
structural and political weaknesses that bred the germs that hastened the 
intolerable deterioration in the human condition.
A fundamental problem is the fast rate of population growth and the 
uneven and uneconomic distribution of the population in the different age 
groups. The youthful population makes high demands on educational, medical 
and other social services while the large number of college graduates and 
school leavers that enter the labour market each year creates an imbalance 
between labour supply and demand.
15. W  A further structural factor is the urban bias and socially unequal 
distribution of critical factors and resources for human development such as 
employment, income, food and nutrition and health and education. As is well 
known, this distribution is biased against the majority of the population 
living mainly in the rural areas and in favour of the politically vocal 
minority in the urban enclaves. Economic issues have overshadowed social 
concerns and have prevented African countries from according the needed
centrality to the human dimension and the human factor.
16.¥^ Finally, the political context for promoting healthy human development 
has been marred, for more than two decades, by instability, war, intolerance,
I
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restrictions on the freedom and human rights of individuals and groups as well 
as overcentralization of power with attendant restrictions on popular 
participation in decision-making. In such a context, the motivation of many 
Africans to achieve their best in productivity and the enhancement of their 
own and society’s well-being has been severely constrained. In times of 
economic crisis, the politically stronger social groups and individuals 
survive while the weaker ones go under in increasing deprivation, social 
dislocation, hunger, ill-health or death.
B. THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES
17-f/ From the causes mentioned so far flow the consequences of wretched 
misery, marginalization and - for millions - very literally premature death. 
The severity of the African crisis is such that country after country has been 
putting in place structural adjustment programmes in their effort to halt 
their economic degradation and achieve a turn-around. Unfortunately, far too 
many of these programmes - whether nationally conceived or in collaboration 
with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the donor community - 
are rending the fabric of the African society. Rather than improve the human 
condition, some Structural Adjustment Programmes have aggravated it because 
they are incomplete, mechanistic and of too short a time perspective.
1 8 . Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) are incomplete because they are 
often implemented as if fiscal, trade and price balances are ends in 
themselves and are virtually complete sets of means to production increases. 
Human condition imbalances as related to employment, incomes, nutrition, 
health and education do not receive equal priority in attention to 
macro-economic imbalances. Unless and until they make the elimination of 
these human condition imbalances central targets, stabilization and adjustment 
programmes cannot provide Africa's growth and development dynamic.
19-V^( They are too mechanistic in being inadequately grounded in, or 
sensitive to specific national economic, human and cultural realities. This 
is aggravated by an incomplete articulation which allows the gaps between 
macro models and contextual realities to remain largely unobserved. Nor can 
we evaluate how rapidly production can be expanded; where, by whom and of 
what. Thus their human condition impact remains inadequately projected
instead of being at the centre of target-setting, policy formulation and 
programme or project choice.
20 .W  They are in too short a time perspective. Africa cannot wait for the 
attainment of external equilibrium and fiscal balance before seeking to 
improve the human condition, nor can long-term human investment to strengthen 
the institutional, scientific, technical and productive capacity operating in 
environmental balance be postoned. That is essential to attaining the more 
stable and less vulnerable economic position that we aspire to for the African 
continent.
2 1 . Further, we must place squarely on record that the external context 
confronting Africa continues to deteriorate. The terms of trade losses of 
1986 vastly exceeded net resource transfers to Africa. APPER is not receiving 
either the new concessional transfer support or the debt burden relief it 
projects as essential, or which UN-PAERD committed the international community 
to providing. This is not simply an African view - the World Bank has 
repeatedly said the same thing as has the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory 
Group on Financial Flow for Africa, a majority of whom are practising bankers.
2 2 . 5/ We welcome the increased concern for the human dimension in 
stabilisation and adjustment programmes, broadly expressed within the 
international community. But this is far from being enough. The gap between 
the expression of concern and actual programme implementation remains wide. 
Human dimension elements are additions, often long after programme initiation, 
rather than integral parts of their overall design. Those poor and vulnerable 
groups to be served are often narrowed down to those who are the victims of 
the stabilization programme, rather than addressing the human condition of all 
the absolutely poor and vulnerable people.
23. In the light of all the foregoing, we do not hesitate to reiterate the 
central position that the human dimension should be accorded in the 
stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes, for we are convinced 
beyond doubt that no nation can be great and prosperous if the majority of its 
people are poor, malnourished, illiterate, miserable and perpetually 
vulnerable.
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2 M . W  Overall, we identify five distinct areas on which greater awareness and 
action must be focused by the African governments, the international financial 
institutions and the international community at large. Firstly, all 
structural adjustment programmes in Africa must be designed, implemented and 
monitored as part of the long-term framework of Africa's development. These 
programmes must, therefore, be incontrovertibly compatible with the objectives 
and aspirations of the African people as outlined in the Lagos Plan of Action 
and the Final Act of Lagos. Secondly, the human dimension must be the fulcrum 
of the adjustment programmes. Thirdly, the structural adjustment policies 
must incorporate the relevant adjustments of the social sector. Fourthly, 
considerations must be made of the consequences of macro-policies on the poor 
and vulnerable not only so as to design temporary and independent compensatory 
additional programmes but to make the alleviation of absolute and relative 
poverty and the elimination of gender biases integral parts and factors of the 
adjustment programmes. Lastly, the entire process of monitoring the 
stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes must incorporate the social 
aspects and criteria.
2 5 . ^  We regard it as the primary responsibility of African Governments to 
develop a richer articulation of the total macro-framework within which to 
reorientate these programmes.
26.W  Structural adjustment programmes must be made to complement the efforts 
of African Governments to attain their long-term development objectives. 
Consequently, they should, through their effects on the economy and the 
African social fabric, contribute to the preservation of basic human rights 
and fundamental freedoms and help to eliminate policies that discriminate 
against minority and vulnerable groups. Above all, the application of 
structural adjustment measures should restore, not corrode the dignity of the 
African as a human being.
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